The Dreams of a Utopia


February 02, 2026

Historically, societies were structured by explicit hierarchies: monarchs exercised authority, outlaws operated outside the law, and the majority of individuals were constrained by the circumstances of their birth, with little agency to alter their social position.

Although such arrangements are often regarded as relics of the past, the underlying dynamics persist in contemporary forms. The specific actors and mechanisms have changed, but the fundamental structure of power and privilege remains.

In the present context, those with disproportionate access to resources and influence—such as individuals or entities controlling military power or financial systems—occupy the functional role previously held by monarchs.

Similarly, the contemporary analog of outlaws consists of states and entities that engage in acts of aggression or violations of international norms without effective accountability.

The modern equivalent of inherited privilege is determined by factors such as birthplace and citizenship, which confer significant advantages in mobility, security, and access to resources, often without conscious awareness on the part of those who possess them.

This raises the question of whether these contemporary forms of concentrated power and inherited advantage will eventually be rendered obsolete, as previous social structures have been.
Before considering potential solutions, it is important to examine the limitations of ethical principles such as the reciprocity principle (the 'golden rule'). While this principle works effectively at the interpersonal level, its application at the intergroup or international level becomes problematic due to the emergence of collective identities.
To illustrate, consider a scenario in which one state initiates aggression against another. The conventional response, as observed historically, is for the more powerful state to retaliate with greater force, rather than to seek dialogue or restraint as the reciprocity principle would suggest. This demonstrates the breakdown of ethical reciprocity at the level of state interactions.
In practice, such restraint is rarely observed, even though it would likely reduce harm and prevent cycles of retaliation. The pursuit of retribution tends to exacerbate conflict and increase collective suffering.
A common argument is that failing to retaliate signals weakness and invites further aggression, at both the interpersonal and international levels. However, this assumption is not valid and often perpetuates destructive cycles of violence.

The dynamics of conflict and deterrence are structurally similar across individuals, groups, and states. In interpersonal contexts, the presence of an external authority—such as law enforcement—enables individuals to de-escalate or forgive transgressions, relying on the existence of a system that enforces norms and deters escalation. In the international context, however, there is no overarching authority or enforcement mechanism. The absence of a global justice system precludes the reliable application of ethical principles such as reciprocity between states. If such a system existed, it would provide the necessary conditions for mutual restraint and the consistent application of ethical norms at the international level.
Historically, the establishment of legal authority in previously unregulated environments led to the reduction of lawlessness and the imposition of order. The question arises whether a similar process is feasible at the international level: can mechanisms be developed to constrain the actions of states that act outside established norms, and to create structures that deter disproportionate or arbitrary responses to perceived threats?
The difficulty arises when the entity violating norms is not an individual but a state. Unlike individuals, who can be held directly accountable through established legal mechanisms, states are collective abstractions. Responsibility is diffused among many agents, each of whom can claim to be acting under orders or within institutional constraints. Leadership is often insulated from direct consequences, and even when individuals are removed, the institutional structure persists, reproducing similar patterns of behavior. This persistence is a consequence of the abstract, non-individual nature of states.
A common proposal is to eliminate national borders and establish a single global government, under the assumption that this would resolve issues of accountability and coordination. However, such centralization risks creating a system in which power is concentrated and unaccountable, with no alternative jurisdictions or mechanisms for exit. As the scale of governance increases, the connection between decision-makers and those affected by their decisions weakens, and the potential for unresponsive or indifferent authority grows. In such a scenario, individuals may find themselves trapped with nowhere to go.

What we need is neither a world government nor anarchy. But something more subtle:
Accountability is most effectively realized in small-scale, local contexts, where individuals interact directly and are known to one another. As groups become larger and more abstract, responsibility becomes diffuse and it becomes easier for individuals to evade accountability. To preserve meaningful ethical norms, such as reciprocity, it is necessary to maintain decision-making at a scale where personal relationships and direct communication are possible, rather than relying on impersonal institutions or symbols.
It is conceivable that future governance structures could take the form of a global, post-sovereign constitutional order, characterized by the absence of any central, autonomous authority—whether individual or state. In such a system, governance would be implemented through institutional mechanisms that operate independently of any single agent's will.

Rather than locating sovereignty in states or their leaders, it is preferable to conceive of sovereignty and accountability as properties instantiated at the level of individuals. In this framework, each person is directly responsible for their actions, without recourse to collective abstractions or hierarchical authority. This eliminates the possibility of evading responsibility by appealing to institutional roles or group membership.

Sovereignty and accountability should be localized to the individual, such that each person can be regarded as a sovereign and accountable agent.

Localized, communal decision-making within small communities can promote the common good and reduce the risk of systematic exclusion or marginalization of minorities. In such arrangements, power remains distributed and subject to ongoing oversight by the community, rather than being concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or groups.

Democratic processes are most effective at small scales, where the consequences of decisions are visible, minorities are recognized as concrete individuals, and those responsible for enforcing communal norms are personally known. This scale prevents the abstraction of individuals into mere statistical entities and ensures that reputation and personal accountability remain operative.

From localized decision-making and mutually agreed, context-dependent rules for inter-community interaction, large-scale patterns of coordination can emerge without centralized authority. This is analogous to the emergence of complex collective behavior in biological systems, where simple local rules give rise to effective and adaptive global order.

These emergent large-scale patterns can, in turn, influence local decision-making, creating a feedback loop between local and global dynamics.

Human systems differ from biological analogues primarily in the capacity for large-scale collaboration in domains such as science, art, and technology, where peer review and collective evaluation are essential. These activities require mechanisms distinct from those governing power.

Individuals may retain private property and the opportunity for economic advancement; however, economic status or property ownership would not confer political authority or special privileges.

The combination of localized democracy, emergent global coordination, and individual sovereignty and accountability constitutes a model of governance that integrates the benefits of constitutional capitalism with participatory decision-making. For domains of global significance—such as science, ethics, technology, the arts, and sports—decision-making should be based on evidence and peer evaluation, with global platforms for expression and competition. Even religion, in this context, can be understood as a form of communal artistic expression.

The function of political institutions should be limited to managing shared logistical needs, while domains such as inquiry, ethics, entertainment, and non-dominating competition, such as sports, are best addressed at the global level. Democracy is most effective at the local communal scale, where interpersonal relationships and the consequences of actions are directly observable. Large-scale order should emerge from the interaction of local communities, rather than from centralized authority.

For example, consider the global consensus among scientists and ethicists regarding the negative consequences of climate change. While these experts provide analysis and recommendations, implementation occurs at the local level, where communities make decisions based on their specific circumstances and resources. In one region, this may result in the adoption of advanced technologies and infrastructure, while in another, incremental improvements are made according to local needs and constraints. The impact and feasibility of proposed solutions thus vary across contexts.

Over time, local adoption of beneficial practices, such as clean energy, can spread through processes of observation, imitation, and competition among neighboring communities. As resources and opportunities become more evenly distributed, communities are incentivized to adopt effective solutions to avoid being left behind. This dynamic leads to the diffusion of innovation and the gradual alignment of practices across regions, not through centralized mandates, but through local adaptation and mutual influence.

Despite cultural and contextual differences, fundamental aspects of human nature are shared across populations. Individuals universally seek well-being, respect, and participation in collective life. Historical tendencies toward domination and exclusion have often been justified by the erroneous belief that certain groups are inherently untrustworthy or incapable of self-governance, leading to systems of colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, and, in extreme cases, violence and oppression.

While conflicts and harmful groups may persist, the presence of a justice system with the authority to adjudicate disputes and enforce laws—without direct involvement in political decision-making—can provide stability. Judicial power, when separated from legislative authority, tends to be less susceptible to abuse and can serve as a safeguard against arbitrary or harmful governance.

Power is the ability to carry out one’s will with respect to collective affairs, despite opposition to that will, but political power adds something more: institutional backing (law, police, courts). And political power can come from coercion (as in dictatorships), periodic consent (as in democratic republics), or tradition and ideology (as in monarchies or theocracies). The goal is to choose periodic consent, but make it so localized to communities, and to give the ability to represent and decide on matters of collective affairs so tentative that political power is reduced to no more than the exercise of a contingent job on behalf of the people—a job like that of tutor—you keep it as long as you do it well with care. The trick is to keep that power on a short leash, hand it out to the locals, make it so fragile and temporary that it’s just another gig—like tutoring algebra to a roomful of half-awake kids. You hold onto it only as long as you don’t screw it up. Nobody ever points at the tutor, the night watchman, the guy hauling hay, or the nurse on the graveyard shift and says, ‘There goes a man or woman in power.’ That’s how it ought to be for the folks we send to handle the messy business of collective affairs. And that reinterpretation of representatives of collective affairs (I don't think we should call them politicians) can work only when people have the power to choose or stop choosing their service at any time. This reinterpretation works best at smaller scales. That also holds for other service jobs. Imagine a nurse as the only nurse for the whole country, and she becomes powerful instantly.

Could a community survive with politics stripped out, left with nothing but a court to settle the inevitable squabbles? Imagine it: decisions hammered out by consensus when the stakes are low—where to slap down a new building, say—and by cold logic when the stakes are high, like whether to order doses of a vaccine for some creeping disease, and by raw empathy when the stakes are human, like whether to let some poor bastard off the hook for a petty crime. I think it could work. I'll call this contextual decision-making—it's democratic, rational, and empathetic all at once— and that concoction can work only on a small scale.

At the global level, institutions should be designed to provide essential services such as social security, disaster response, and public health, operating on a non-profit basis with stable, predictable policies. Local governments would retain responsibility for local issues, while global institutions would intervene only as necessary and with the consent of affected communities. Legislative authority at larger scales should be temporary and limited in scope, minimizing the potential for the accumulation of unaccountable power. This arrangement would resemble certain aspects of the European Union, in terms of functional integration without centralized political authority.

A potential challenge arises when an entire community collectively disregards established norms or laws. While enforcement mechanisms exist, their effectiveness depends on the scale and cohesion of the community. However, the difficulties associated with enforcing compliance at the local level are distinct from those encountered in attempting to police entire states, where impersonal structures and widespread noncompliance can render enforcement ineffective.
In small communities, authority figures are typically members of the community themselves and are subject to the same standards of accountability as others. When collective norms break down, the community may attempt to restore order through dialogue and negotiation. If these efforts fail and the community becomes isolated or ungovernable, external connections may be severed, resulting in social and economic consequences that are more acutely felt in smaller, interconnected groups.

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